存货的期末计量及其账务处理

本文阐述了存货期末计量的原则和存货减值迹象的判断,并用实例说明存货可变现净值的确定方法及其存货跌价准备的会计核算方法.     

Assessing the cumulative effects of stress: The association between job stress and allostatic load in a large sample of Chinese employees

Job stress can lead to various system dysfunctions, but until now no reliable biomarkers for its assessment have been identified. Allostatic load (AL) is an index that enables the cumulative effect on the body of chronic stress to be assessed, and is derived from a set of relevant biological measures. In this study, a 13-parameter index (building on the original 10-item index) was used to examine the relationship between job strain and AL. Participants were 1219 healthy Chinese employees. Job strain was measured using the Job Content Questionnaire, and AL was assessed by various possible stress responses, including blood pressure, cholesterol, indicators of glucose metabolism, and hormone and inflammation markers. AL in the high job strain group differed sharply from that in the low job strain group. The AL score was positively associated with age and educational level. Several individual parameters also differed between the two groups. Men scored significantly higher on AL and cardiovascular and metabolic health outcomes, whereas for women the associations appeared in the biological indicators. Analyses indicated that decision latitude (DL) and job demands were significantly related to AL. Job demands correlated significantly with the primary biological indicators and DL with the secondary health outcomes. In conclusion, this study provides evidence of the value of measuring allostatic load in assessing the chronic effects of job stress.     

知识员工目标取向与知识团队反思对知识活动行为的交互影响研究

知识经济时代,科技型企业对知识型团队与知识型员工的依赖程度越来越高,知识型员工的知识获取与知识分享等知识活动行为越来越受到组织研究者的关注。本文综合运用目标取向理论与团队反思理论,将知识团队反思纳入到知识员工目标取向对知识活动行为影响的研究中,并推导出一个跨层次交互作用模型。通过对116个知识团队(含601个知识员工)样本的调查分析,得出实证研究结果 :知识员工学习取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为具有显著的正向效应,且团队反思可以显著调节(增强)学习取向对知识分享行为的影响作用;证明取向对知识获取行为的影响效应不显著,但对知识分享行为具有显著的正向效应,而团队反思可以显著调节(增强)证明取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为的影响作用;回避取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为均具有显著的负向效应,且团队反思可以显著调节(削弱)回避取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为的影响作用。最后讨论了研究的管理启示、研究局限及研究展望。     

耦合网络边相继故障模型研究

针对耦合网络上频发的相继故障问题,通过分析边级联故障蔓延的动力学演化机制,构建耦合网络上边相继故障模型。以提高耦合网络整体抵制相继故障能力为出发点,依据不同度量指标,多角度分析具有不同耦合模式的耦合网络鲁棒性与模型参数之间的关联性,研究耦合网络间耦合模式和网络基本模型等因素对相继故障的影响,探讨耦合网络边相继故障模型的整体保护策略。研究结果表明,同配连接模式能够增强耦合网络抵制级联故障的鲁棒性;相互依赖的两个耦合网络之间拓扑结构越相似,网络抵制相继故障的鲁棒性越强;耦合网络鲁棒性与网络平均度正相关;适当的增加耦合网络间对称边数量,能够有效提高网络的鲁棒性。最后,应用边相继故障模型在耦合电力网络上进行实例分析。     

信息过载影响消费者决策研究的知识图谱分析

以CNKI数据库中收录的553篇相关论文为研究对象,本文使用CiteSpace可视化分析工具绘制关键词图谱。结果显示:国内对信息过载和消费者决策研究以应对策略为主,分为以消费者为中心的策略、以信息处理为中心的策略和以技术为中心的策略。     

知识型团队动态能力构建、团队体系模型与创新运作模式研究

知识型团队是现代组织执行复杂创新任务的重要组织形式.本文从分析知识型团队与知识工作任务的匹配关系入手,在引入知识链及知识链网络等概念的基础上,探讨了基于知识链的知识型团队的动态能力构建机制,分析了围绕知识链网络的知识团队结构体系模型及创新运作机理.     

Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games

We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budget-balanced, in the core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budget-balanced mechanism in the core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can always recover more than $\frac{1}{\ln n}$ of the total cost and in the core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give a cost allocation method that always recovers $\frac{1}{\ln d_{\mathit{max}}}$ of the total cost, where d _max is the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than $\frac{1}{n}$ of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost sharing scheme that always recovers at least $\frac{1}{2n}$ of the total cost for every subset of players and furthermore, our scheme is cross-monotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, under the assumption that all sets are simple sets; further, the total cost of the set cover is no more than ln?d _max times that of an optimal solution. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism to them. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements.